During 1968-69, members of the United Nations, meeting in the Legal Committee of the General Assembly, negotiated a Convention on Special Missions, sometimes known as the New York Convention, setting out the privileges and immunities of ad hoc embassies between states. The negotiation was part of a process through which the UN sought to clarify the status and rights of official representatives, so that diplomacy could function with security and certainty. This article looks at the role of one leading power, the United Kingdom, in the talks. It explores how British interests were defined, the tactics used to secure them and how London came to terms with pressure from other states to redefine its approach. The focus is on the overall political thrust of the British negotiating position, as formulated mainly by the Foreign Office, rather than the detailed talks on such thorny issues as tax avoidance and diplomatic property. The articles shows that, while London was keen to see a codification of diplomatic law, Cold War considerations made it less than enthusiastic about an upsurge in the number of special missions that the New York Convention might encourage.
During 1968-69, members of the United Nations (UN), meeting in the Legal Committee of the General Assembly, negotiated a Convention on Special Missions, sometimes known as the New York Convention, setting out the privileges and immunities of the ever-increasing number of ad hoc embassies that passed between states. This agreement followed the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which set out the privileges and immunities of permanent embassies, and was part of a process through which the UN sought to clarify the status and rights of official representatives, so that diplomacy could function with greater security and certainty. This article looks at the role of one major power, the United Kingdom (UK) of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in the talks of 1968-69. It explores how British interests were defined on this issue, the tactics used to secure their aims in the multilateral negotiations and how they came to terms with pressure from other states to define a Convention very different from the one London originally envisaged. The focus is very much on the overall political thrust of the British negotiating position, as formulated mainly by the Foreign Office (FO). Only limited attention is paid to specific amendments of many of the individual articles, the detailed negotiations in New York, or the position of ministries in London concerned with such thorny issues as tax avoidance, customs controls and diplomatic property. Such a look at the general UK position reveals that, while London was keen to see a codification of diplomatic law, it was less than enthusiastic about an upsurge in the number of special missions that the New York Convention might encourage. In particular, the British feared that the Soviet bloc might exploit the Convention to flood London and other Western capitals with spies. In the early stages of the negotiation, (US) in 1945. In fact, bearing in mind the New York Convention's definition of the term, any official, one-off embassies abroad -such as those by heads of state and government (at 'summit' level), by foreign ministers, indeed by anyone officially accredited -are special missions. A study of British diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s, found examples of special missions that included retired civil servants and generals, business leaders, lawyers, members of the Opposition and even members of the royal family. 6 The special mission is clearly a flexible institution, used for diverse purposes. These include, to list only a selection, negotiating technical questions (where a permanent embassy might not be equipped for the task), attending major ceremonies (like the funeral of a great figure) and dealing with states where there were no diplomatic relations. The number of such missions has grown apace since 1945 for a number of reasons, including the easy availability of jet air transport, the increasing number of independent states and the growing number of technical issues in an interdependent world, which are better resolved by experts than by the staff of resident embassies. It was easier to send out special missions than ever before and, an essential point for many less-developed states, a more convenient, cheaper practice than setting up permanent diplomatic posts in other capitals. 7 However, the mushrooming number of special missions served to expose the legal uncertainties that surrounded them. While some forms of ad hoc visit had long possessed privileges and immunities in international custom, most notably those made by heads of state 8 , and while it was widely agreed that they all deserved some kind of protection, this was nowhere laid down in an agreed form. There was an argument that this absence did not really matter since, in practice, special missions 'seldom gave rise to any practical difficulties' and, in many cases, where it was necessary to give legal protection to a special envoy, 'it was always possible to accredit him for a short period as a member of This was partly because such a restrictive approach was felt to fit the wishes of Parliament, the legal profession, the Press and the general public, who were already resentful of the ability of diplomats to avoid paying taxes and evade traffic regulations.
However, there were similar concerns within government, not least from the Inland Revenue, which was keen to crack down on tax avoidance by those claiming diplomatic privileges. 13 Perhaps because of a lack of qualified legal advisers in many foreign ministries, few other governments responded to the initial invitation for comments on the ILC's draft articles. As a result, a second invitation for comments was sent out by the UN Secretary- Governments were invited to submit views on the ILC's draft articles to the SecretaryGeneral by 1 July and this led to a renewed, more urgent debate in London.
The British Dilemma
The British negotiating position did not seem strong in the wake of the 1967 sessions. In retrospect, such fears may appear exaggerated, but it is worth emphasising that, just three years later, in September 1971, the problems of monitoring Soviet activities in
Britain led to the expulsion of more than a hundred of their diplomatic staff and soured bilateral relations for years. In 1968, it was reckoned that, between them, the Soviet embassy and trade mission included 122 intelligence officers, with more employed at consular offices, all of which posed a major challenge to the counter-intelligence service,
MI5
. 18 Derick Ashe, the head of the FO's Security Department, which was responsible for liaison with the intelligence services, echoed Smith's arguments. Ashe opposed any measure that might provide 'unfriendly governments with additional umbrellas for intelligence operations', and he expressed concern over the draft Convention's obligation on third states to allow the free passage of special missions from one state to another.
This, too, might be exploited by unfriendly governments to send their officials to the UK for an indeterminate period. Like Smith, he wanted to reduce the scope of the Convention 'as much as possible.' 19 Even though the draft Convention included the need for receiving states to approve special missions, the FO feared that 'Communist countries would be skilful in exploiting every opportunity to create situations in which it could be difficult for Her Majesty's Government to refuse consent.' 20 That was one reason why the FO hoped to strengthen the relevant Article, so that 'express consent' was required for missions.
Defining a British Position, March-October 1968
To prepare their negotiating position, the government's Immunities and Privileges
Committee decided in March 1968 to establish an inter-departmental working group. 21 This included representatives from the FO, Commonwealth Office, Law Officers' Department, Home Office and Customs and Excise, with Denza as chair, and with representatives of other departments invited to attend when necessary. 22 Their task was threefold: to prepare comments on the ILC draft, suggest amendments to this and consider the best way of securing these amendments. 23 As a basis for discussion, the FO drafted comments on the ILC's 1967 draft Convention, which largely mirrored those of May 1966. The British were not negative about an agreement. Indeed, they still believed that in some ways it did not go far enough and that (partly to prevent the need for further conventions) its provisions should cover missions to ad hoc international conferences.
However, the main British argument remained that the 'level of privileges and immunities is too high… not sufficiently related to functional need and… not confined to the minimum essential to enable missions to discharge their duties effectively.' The FO believed that 'most visits of representatives on official business should take place without rigid formality.' The Office was willing to extend the proposed privileges and immunities to 'high-ranking' missions, such as those led by ministers, and to those engaged in 'highly sensitive or dangerous' tasks, though it was unclear how these last would be defined. But it wanted a second, lower level of privileges and immunities for 'routine missions of a technical or economic character', while 'visits of a routine character by government officials should not receive privileges or immunities at all.' Effectively, then, at this point the FO wanted a three-tier system of special missions. The other main British 13 aim was to ensure that the application of the Convention should be 'subject to the express consent of the receiving State', even if this could be given informally. 24 There was a range of other concerns within the Office about a Convention, including exemptions it might give from taxes, customs duties and prosecution for traffic offences. 25 The working group held its first meeting on 22 March 1968, when the representative from the Law Officers' Department expressed scepticism about the whole idea of negotiating a Convention, but Denza insisted that it was British policy to support the codification of international law. Discussion focused on the FO's draft comments on the Convention. These were largely approved, with Michael Jenkins, of the Office's Northern Department, underlining the danger that, if restrictions on special missions were not tight enough, they could be exploited by Communist states. He wanted to see a close definition of the term 'special mission' and clarification that they were for 'specific shortterm negotiations…' The meeting agreed to pursue the idea of a three-tier system of special missions, despite doubts about how easy it would be to differentiate between the tiers. 26 Further meetings of the working group, during April and May, discussed the FO paper and agreed specific comments on individual articles in the draft convention. 27 The proposed negotiating position was then circulated round Whitehall and beyond, but drew some criticisms. The British mission at the UN, whose prime concern was the practical business of negotiating the Convention, feared that the idea of three tiers of special mission 'does not seem sufficiently clearly defined or sufficiently supported by argument to carry conviction', especially because it was difficult to distinguish between the second and third levels. Specialised Agencies. However, other members were worried that it might be dismissed by the Afro-Asian bloc as an 'uncooperative' step, or that it could be ruled out simply because it would be time-consuming to negotiate. As a result, the group decided to seek a system based on two tiers only, with the number of missions on the higher scale to be kept limited in number. These missions, which would be given privileges and immunities in line with the ILC draft, would generally be led by a head of state, head of government or a minister and their privileges and immunities would revert to the lower tier if the head returned home. However, other missions could be included by mutual agreement between the sending and receiving states. The majority of missions would be granted a lower level of privileges and immunities but, since these would be in line with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN's Specialised Agencies, it was hoped they would be acceptable to member states. 29 This position, along with other detailed comments on the draft articles, then went back to the Immunities and Privileges Committee for approval. 30 Despite some redrafting of detailed points, this remained the British position in October 1968, when discussions in the Sixth Committee began. In trying to achieve their aim, the British, well aware that 'an attack openly directed at fundamental revision of the final draft Articles could be counter-productive', planned to appear positive and constructive.
In the last analysis, however, if 'there should be an attempt to steamroller the draft press the need for more attention to procedures. The Sixth Committee, working as it was to a tight deadline, was likely to deal with the Convention 'at some speed' and it was essential that Britain must have strong allies. Otherwise, 'the discussions will pass us by;
we will be unable to influence the development of the draft and will end up with a Nonetheless, the FO did not begin to gather support in earnest until the Summer, after the working group had prepared Britain's negotiating stance. In late July, Puleston drafted a telegram to send to British posts, asking them to enlist support for London's position. 36 But, perhaps because it was the holiday season, this was not sent out by Lees
Mayall, Head of the Protocol and Conference Department, until 20 August, accompanied by a warning that Communist countries would try to 'railroad' the draft articles through. 37 The UK's proposed amendments to the draft Convention were only sent on 23
September, a matter of weeks before the General Assembly was due to get to work. 38 Even though it was decided to omit the Soviet bloc, China and two countries with which London currently had no diplomatic relations (Syria and Guatemala), and while the British continued to make a separate effort in the Council of Europe, this still amounted to a large-scale campaign, involving ninety countries. There was a particular effort to secure US sympathy, but the State Department was doubtful about the chances of fundamental alterations to the ILC draft and felt that a British campaign to amend them could prove counter-productive. Richard Kearney, who did much to shape the Department's views on the issue, had himself been part of the ILC in the 1967 talks and his experience evidently left him very doubtful about altering the Commission's approach. 39 Indeed, so strong were his feelings that the British felt it would only be possible to alter US pessimism if they could muster support for their own views elsewhere. 40 Meanwhile, it was hoped that the Americans would 'keep their views to themselves while we are canvassing.' 41 In contrast to American caution, the French took an even more critical view of the ILC proposals than Britain did. Paris proposed many amendments to them, an approach that the FO felt was 'tactically less likely to succeed.' 42 More encouraging was the sympathy expressed for the British by almost all the members of the Council of Europe, who discussed the issue in September. The Canadians were also ready to support the British case. 43 There were other states that needed little persuasion to sign up as allies.
Pro-Western, economically-developed countries like Australia and Japan, had little desire to create a far-reaching Convention. 44 The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also expressed support for the British approach, as did other firmly anti-Soviet regimes like South Africa and Pakistan. 45 Nonetheless, some pro-Western states were more lukewarm.
The Moroccan government, for example, was keen to prevent Communist infiltration under the guise of diplomatic missions, but the King was also an avid employer of special emissaries and he favoured broad privileges and immunities for them. 46 In Israel, too, the foreign ministry's legal adviser, Yehuda Gera, felt his country would gain from greater protection for special missions, especially when so many other states did not recognise
Israel's existence. One of the many elastic elements of the ILC draft was that diplomatic recognition was not necessary for special missions to pass between two states, a point
Israel could only welcome. 47 Despite French scepticism about the Convention, it was felt that many of their former African colonies, like Senegal, Mauretania and Mali, would fall in behind the Afro-Asian desire for a strong Convention. 48 When approaching the foreign ministry in Algiers, Nicholas Fenn, Britain's Head of Chancery, 'tried to make their blood curdle a little by suggesting possible activities on the part of a mission from an unnamed country to Algeria', but this had no effect. Fenn was left with the feeling that Algerian officials 'thought that we were making an unnecessary fuss', that they would follow the Soviets on 'this rather esoteric question.' 49 The attitude of most governments to the draft Convention was one of indifference.
Ronald McKeever, who was jointly British ambassador to Togo and Dahomey, approached senior figures in both foreign ministries but found them ignorant of the whole question -though McKeever felt that it would be possible to win them over by stressing 'the danger of free-wheeling missions from communist countries which might descend on their capitals.' 50 The Niger foreign minister doubted that many special missions would want to visit in his country, while the foreign ministries of Ivory Coast and Upper Volta were described as 'more or less a man, a couple of boys, a French typist and a French
Conseiller Technique', who were too busy with other issues to worry about special missions. In any case, their ambassadors to the UN were likely to 'disregard orders if they conflict with the African lobby consensus in New York.' 51 It was difficult to get a view from the Mexican government because it was preoccupied with hosting the Olympic Games. Indeed, by the time the Mexicans expressed a detailed opinion the British proposal for a two-tier approach had already been rejected in New York. 52 From many governments, it was not even possible to extract an opinion.
Preparing for the second round, December 1968 to August 1969
In the aftermath of the 1968 negotiations, Darwin, from the perspective of the UN mission, felt the British campaign had been poorly organised, hence Britain's inability to shape the draft document in the ways it wanted. Although the UK took part in a 'western group' within the Sixth Committee, where there was some sympathy for its views:
…our prospects… were much weakened because we presented our ideas so late in the year. This meant that the lobbying in capitals was too near the Assembly ...
Secondly, it meant that we had to present the text of our proposal to the delegations in the Sixth Committee almost as a novelty, since few of them had worked out the real meaning of our written comments and many no doubt had not read them. were keen to protect special missions: 'It would be hard to say that there is no foundation for the assertion that emergent countries which cannot afford to train and pay a large diplomatic service or to keep up many permanent diplomatic establishments find it economical and convenient to use special missions for ad hoc diplomacy.'
Nevertheless, the situation was not without hope. Rather than pushing through a
Convention at this point, as some delegations had wanted, the Sixth Committee had agreed to suspend its work. This could 'reasonably be interpreted as showing that more than a few delegations were willing to allow us the opportunity to reconsider the problems and create new proposals to overcome them.' Furthermore, the atmosphere in New York had been 'friendly and tolerant', it was clear that the USSR wanted to reach agreement on an acceptable draft and there was evidence of 'a general disposition to take the views of others into account and to search for compromise solutions.' After all, there was little point for anyone in producing a draft that many states refused to sign. Partly because they took such a keen interest in the issue, the UK had got onto the fifteenmember Drafting Committee, as had France, which put both in a strong position to have their views count. 53 Additional hope was provided, in February 1969, by a meeting between Doris Puleston and a member of the French foreign ministry, when it emerged that, despite its uncompromising approach to the recent talks in the Sixth Committee, Paris had similar feelings about future negotiations. Ideally, they wanted to accept such a 22 document, but they were determined to see some amendments to it, so as to restrict its applicability, and they also hoped to secure a tight definition of the term 'special mission' in the opening article. This showed that the UK and France might be able to work together on the issue. 54 Philip Allott, one of the FO's Assistant Legal Advisers, who had attended the New York sessions, was more hopeful than Darwin that it might be possible to achieve a tighter definition of special missions in the Convention's first article. In early 1969, this view began to gather support in the FCO. Allott put his case to the inter-departmental working group at the end of January, where there was general acceptance that a two-tier system was now impossible. It certainly seemed that 'nothing is likely to change the basic attitude of the majority in the Sixth Committee' that the ILC draft, with its extensive privileges and immunities was acceptable. Rather than turning Britain's back on the document, London preferred to continue efforts to amend it. But it was clear that securing amendments to a number of articles would be a difficult business. It was far easier to find some kind of general solution to the British dilemma. Since the idea of creating two tiers of mission -the central plank of their position in 1968 -appeared a forlorn hope, the UK focused on a different strategy, effectively aimed at limiting the application of the Convention as a whole via a restrictive definition of special missions, linked to amendments to the specific articles on privileges and immunities. 55 To achieve this, there was a renewed attempt to coordinate policy with the French and, in late May, another discussion at the Council of Europe. The last proved to be a muddled discussion and it proved difficult to produce a restrictive definition of the term 'special mission', although there was general agreement that one was desirable. In particular, it was agreed that missions must be diplomatic in nature (as opposed to having, say, some artistic, sporting or scientific purpose) and that they must be recognised as such by both the sending and receiving states. The Council of Europe members also accepted that, if a restrictive definition of special missions could be achieved, then it would be easier to accept a broad definition of immunities and privileges in other articles. 56 The British subsequently drafted a paper, for discussion with other governments, on defining the term 'special missions'. The 1967 ILC draft definition had read that, 'A "special mission" is a mission of a representative and temporary character sent by one
State to another State to deal with that State on specific questions or to perform in relation to the latter State a specific task.' The British knew that careful consideration had gone into this definition and that it was already seen, by the ILC, as being restrictive.
London could see that it differentiated special missions from permanent embassies, that it made clear they must be temporary (not open-ended), that they should operate at state level (and therefore exclude non-governmental bodies) and that they should have some particular task to perform. Indeed, in contrast to the French, the FCO felt that, in the last analysis, they could live with the ILC definition. But they felt it could be improved upon, so as to restrict such missions to diplomatic purposes. They also hoped to add an explicit reference to the need for mutual agreement between the sending and receiving states before a special mission could take place.
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It was clear already that the French government, which all along had been even more critical of the draft Convention than Britain, shared this view and, by mid-August, the French foreign ministry had agreed that its UN mission would work to secure a restrictive definition of special missions. A draft brief for the British delegation instructed 24 them to work closely with the French either to achieve a tighter definition or, failing that, to have inscribed on the record a restrictive interpretation of the existing ILC draft.
Although there were striking similarities in their interests, it was not easy for London and Paris to work together, largely because they had contrasting tactical approaches. The abstentions. The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly on 8 December, with the UK voting among the 88 in favour (with one abstention and none against). It was accompanied by an optional protocol on the resolution of disputes that might arise from its interpretation. 63 In reporting back to the inter-departmental Working Group, the FCO complained that, 'The debates in the Sixth Committee's work were never thorough and scholarly and rapidly developed into a rather half-hearted rubber-stamp operation on the ILC's draft.' However, 'the fact is that the resulting Convention may well find wide acceptance by States' and the 'consensus-building atmosphere happened to be useful to us' in obtaining a restricted definition of special missions.
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Conclusion
Looked at in retrospect, it must be conceded that the New York Convention proved less significant to international diplomacy than its advocates hoped, or the British and other doubters initially feared. Just as many states showed limited interest in the actual negotiations, so they were lethargic about bringing into action, perhaps because many of the more important special missions (especially ministerial visits) were already treated well be recipients. Indeed, UN members were so slow to ratify the document, that it only entered into force on 21 June 1985 67 By September 1968, concern over the Convention was so great that, despite the embarrassment such a step might cause, Lees Mayall argued that a British refusal to sign it 'need not be regarded as a calamity.' 68 This was because the Convention was far from being a neutral document, over which all countries might agree. It was very much a product of its time and London was affected by two broader, contemporary factors. The first was the Cold War, which led to worries about communist exploitation of the Convention to pursue espionage. The second was the fact that 'decolonisation' was currently at its height and, while Britain, France and other Western powers had a global system of permanent embassies, many newly-independent states did not; instead, they relied extensively on special missions to engage in diplomacy. The result of these two developments was that, in the ILC and the General Assembly, the UK felt outnumbered by a combination of the Soviet bloc and Afro-Asian countries. These might push through a far-reaching Convention, which would undermine British security and lead to a mushrooming number of roving diplomats who could evade customs duties, taxes and traffic regulations -and criminal prosecution for serious offences.
In trying to avoid this unwelcome scenario, the British strategy was actually quite simple. As Mayall once wrote, during the negotiations, the UK's 'consistent line has been to advocate a more restricted application of immunities and privileges, based on the principle of functional need…' 69 But there were different ways to achieve this. In 1966, London decided to focus on creating two tiers of special mission. The higher tier, with a full set of privileges and immunities, included missions operating at ministerial level, ones that Britain was well used to sending and receiving. The lower level of immunities could be granted to other missions, whose growing numbers were the development really to be feared. In a way, seeking such a solution to their dilemma made sense. After all, the ILC itself had raised the idea of two tiers in its 1965 discussions. But it made less sense for the UK to adopt this solution in 1967 when the ILC had decided not to pursue it. The result was that the 1968 negotiations went badly for Britain, not helped by its tardiness in mustering support, a lack of sympathy from the US and differences with the French, who were more forthright in their criticisms of the document. In this phases, British influence over the direction of the negotiations seemed almost non-existent. Indeed, but for the slow progress of the Sixth Committee, London could have ended up with a Convention that was little to its liking.
As it transpired, the negotiations continued in 1969 and proved much more successful for Britain, which had a much greater influence over the details of the eventual draft. By focusing on a narrow definition in the first article and by working more closely with France, the British secured a Convention that they could accept. There is no evidence in government files that the Eastern bloc exploited the agreement for nefarious purposes in London. Aside form the terms of the eventual document, the September 1971 expulsion of Soviet diplomats showed that Britain would not tolerate intelligence officers working en masse under diplomatic cover. As a final point, however, it is worth emphasising that the negotiations proved very much a learning experience for the British, especially in terms of understanding why, among a great degree of indifference, some states were keen to protect special missions. In 1968, London had to recognise that a Convention was not simply designed to benefit the Soviet bloc. Even strongly proWestern regimes, like those in Morocco and Israel, could benefit from such a codification. The British gradually recognised, too, that the case for a Convention genuinely made practical sense for many 'third world' states. One official noted in May 1969 how 'we were impressed by the extent to which the developing countries regarded special missions as essentially itinerant diplomatic missions particularly relevant to
